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abstract: The paper intends to focus on the influence of the disinformation passed on via 
social media and the web on voters, that is, on the impact of fake news on elections. On the 
basis of a critical reflection on research in media studies and in cognitive science, meant to 
assess whether, and how far, fake news can switch voting behavior, I shall argue that the 
effect of fake news in this respect is much less than usually assumed. The danger of fake 
news for democratic politics that rather lies in the increase of political polarization and 
hostile attitudes in the public sphere as well as the blurring of truth and falsity in public 
discourse that has caused a widespread mistrust of politics and of experts in general. In the 
first section, I shall discuss the disinformation induced by fake news. I shall set apart political 
fake news from other kinds of fake news, for, in the first case, the influence of social media 
information seems to run along partisan affiliations, either reinforcing preexistent beliefs in 
the case of favorable content or being dismissed as fake in the case of adverse content. In 
the second section, I shall examine what I take to be the main source of distorted political 
information, namely motivated reasoning, and more specifically that form of motivated 
reasoning induced by ideological beliefs and partisan affiliations. In the third section, I 
shall consider the variations in the susceptibility to political fake news in partisans and non-
partisans alike. I shall conclude by stating that, even if fake news does not especially affect 
electoral turnout, the pollution of the public sphere seems to be the most worrying effect of 
fake news and future research should focus on these aspects specifically.
Keywords: Fake news, Political disinformation, Automated cognitive mechanisms, 
Motivated reasoning, Partisan affiliations, Ideology.
Introduction
In the growing literature on fake news, it is commonly assumed that fake news has a 
negative impact on democratic politics and, more specifically, on election turnouts. 
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The Brexit referendum and the American Presidential election of 2016 are typically 
cited as illustrations of this worry, though the actual evidence of such an impact only 
concerns the rise of fake news spreading through the new and the old media, and the 
high speed of its dissemination during the two campaigns. By contrast, there is no 
research supporting the view that the Brexit victory and the Trump election are to 
be ascribed to the fake news effect on voting behavior. This paper intends precisely 
to focus on the influence of the disinformation passed on via social media and the 
web on voters, that is to say, on the impact of fake news on elections. My argument 
will be a critical reflection on research in media studies and in cognitive science to 
assess whether, and how far, fake news can switch voting behavior. I shall argue that 
the effect of fake news in this respect is much less than usually assumed. Yet, fake 
news represents a danger for democratic politics, given that it induces an increase of 
political polarization and hostile attitudes in the public sphere as well as the blurring 
of truth and falsity in public discourse that has caused a widespread mistrust of politics 
and of experts in general.
In the first section, I shall discuss the disinformation induced by fake news. Can 
fake news distort public attitudes and political behavior? Can it, in other words, induce 
a change in electoral behavior, by changing political beliefs and turning the electoral 
result upside down? The empirical findings on these matters are ambiguous. They 
mostly concern the speed of dissemination of fake news, via reposting; but reposting 
is not the same as believing the content of the message. Yet, many researches seem to 
imply that all users of social media tend to be victims of fake news in general (Levy, 
2017). When political information is the issue, however, the influence of social media 
information seems to run along partisan affiliations, either reinforcing preexistent 
beliefs in the case of favorable content or being dismissed as fake in the case of 
adverse content. In brief, the fake news effect seems to lie mainly in the dimension 
of dissemination and among large audiences, while disinformation guiding political 
behavior seems to have an (at least partly) independent explanation.
In the second section, I shall examine what I take to be the main source of distorted 
political information, namely motivated reasoning, and more specifically that form 
of motivated reasoning induced by ideological beliefs and partisan affiliations. Many 
studies focused on the difficulty of debunking and on the persistence of erroneous 
beliefs have traced the problem not to the nature of fake news or in the media of 
transmission, but rather to the motivated reasoning of media users. More specifically, 
the backfire effect of debunking, when the content is adverse political information, 
appears to be linked to the effect of ideology or partisanship. Hence, I claim that the 
inquiry into political disinformation must be focused more on how partisan affiliations 
and their related identities interact with cognition than on the magnifying effect of 
social media. In other words, the alarm surrounding fake news and social media, with 
reference to twisting political behavior, may after all turn out largely misplaced.
In the third section, I shall consider the variations in the susceptibility to political 
fake news in partisans and non-partisans alike. For, if fake news tends to be believed 
according to partisan affiliations, not all citizens with a partisan affiliation are victims 
of motivated reasoning when coming across fake news; besides there are also citizens 
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without partisan identities. In that case, citizens may fall prey to the automated 
cognitive distortions elicited by the platform design. Confronting this risk, empirical 
research has provided some clues suggesting lines of intervention to contrast cognitive 
distortions, whether motivated or unmotivated. Beside possible corrections, there is 
evidence pointing to a diminished circulation of fake news in the Mid-Term American 
election in 2018, as well as to a growing awareness of the public about the dangers of 
fake news in politics. In a word, there are reasons to put the risk of fake news on the 
voting behavior of non-partisans or weak-partisans in perspective. 
I shall conclude by stating that, even if fake news does not especially affect 
electoral turnout, nevertheless the dangers it presents for democracy are considerable; 
they especially concern the increase of political polarization, the opacity of the 
news sources, breaking up reciprocity between citizens, and the blurring of truths, 
falsehoods and “bullshits” in public discourse. The overall result of the cacophony 
and the confusion of information is a growing public mistrust not only for traditional 
information and media, but also for politics, politicians and experts, with serious 
detrimental effects on democratic debate. In sum, the pollution of the public sphere 
seems to be the most worrying effect of fake news and future research should focus 
on these aspects instead of citizen’s induced false beliefs twisting voting behavior. 
Before getting started, a methodological caveat is here in order: this work is 
located at the crossroads between cognitive research – from experimental psychology, 
neuroscience and communication theory – and normative epistemology and political 
theory. I see it as a problem that these disciplines proceed along their own separate 
paths, each largely ignoring the findings of the others. For example, the normative 
theory of democracy is supplemented by a normative theory of the good epistemic 
agent, a theory that, in a way, articulates the epistemic assumptions used to justify 
democracy and making it feasible. The ideal model of the agent is however deeply at 
odds with the findings of experimental psychology, communication theory, cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience. Empirical research into patterns of thought and behavior 
shows that human rationality is limited (and this is hardly a surprise) by systematic 
forms of distortion of knowledge (cognitive biases), by the usual recourse to heuristics 
for time saving and easy response, and by the emotional and affective interplay with 
cognition. In different ways, all these elements interfere with epistemic rationality 
on a regular basis, and usually they are unconscious and outside the direct control of 
agents. Epistemic rationality is therefore a highly idealized model, hardly found in how 
people think in real life circumstances. Normative theories are obviously independent 
in their normative claims from descriptions of reality. The point is however that if the 
premises and the assumptions are empirically problematic, then normative theory can 
hardly apply to the real world, hence losing its relevance or is filed away as a form of 
utopic thinking. There is nothing new about my methodological concern. Rousseau 
stated that he wanted to take “men as they are and institutions as they should be”, and, 
more recently, John Rawls affirmed his intention to present a realistic utopia, built 
on the actual analysis of social and political reality to which appropriate normative 
principles and values should apply in accord with considerations of justice. In my 
research, I would like to bring the findings of the cognitive sciences – pointing out 
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how humans think and behave – to the attention of the normative theory of democracy. 
That descriptive-empirical theories and normative theories should dialogue and take 
each other seriously in order to enrich our knowledge and potentially improve our 
social and political reality looks like a platitude. If one works at the interstices of 
different theories and theoretical approaches, however, one immediately sees that the 
exchange is basically non-existent. The problem is not only of normative theories that 
ignore relevant empirical findings undermining their premises. In fact, the problem 
invests empirical-descriptive theories as well that often generalize certain human traits 
from lab experiments, without considering that a complex social environment as well 
as normative arguments and reasons may affect and change those very traits. After all, 
human minds are at least partly plastic, and can be molded and enhanced by education, 
discipline and experiences. Thus, patterns of reasoning and acting should be taken as 
constraints to be considered and bypassed rather than unmodifiable traits of human 
nature.
1. How Fake News Works on Receivers
1.1. Fake news is a controversial term both in common and technical usages. Its 
widespread presence in political discourse covers different meanings and intentions. 
Fake news is very often the polemical label that politicians and media reporting their 
statements apply to unfavorable political information as an easy way to criticize and 
reject criticisms, without getting into the merits of the accusation. Whatever negative 
information comes about in the public forum relative to any politician or party, it 
is now commonly rejected as “fake news”, as an intentionally planted falsehood to 
discredit him or her, apparently without engaging with the allegation. This partisan 
and symmetrical use of fake news to reject critical information about oneself or one’s 
party, made especially popular by Donald Trump’s tweets, has the effect of wrapping 
political discourse in a fog where truths and fabrications are mixed together, leading 
some commentators to speak about the present as a regime of post-truth (Manjoo, 
2008). Because of this widespread tendentious usage of the expression, some 
researchers reject the term altogether in analytical work, preferring instead to use 
“false information” or disinformation through social media (Vosoughi et al., 2018). 
Other scholars instead maintain that although political disinformation, propaganda, 
manipulation and deception have always been present in the political realm from 
classical antiquity on, fake news presents some specific features that set it apart from 
traditional disinformation (Gelfert, 2018; Galeotti, 2018b). A certain amount of work 
has been done recently among philosophers to provide a rigorous definition of fake 
news, able to capture its specificity and to embrace actual variations (Rini, 2017; 
Gelfert, 2018; Jaster and Lanius, 2018; Croce and Piazza, 2021), but no agreement 
has been reached yet on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the expression. 
Since the focus of this paper is not on a philosophically rigorous definition of fake 
news, but rather on the effects of its spreading on democratic politics, I shall assume 
the general meaning prevalent in media studies since 2015, as a working basis for the 
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discussion on fake news effects. until approximately 2015, fake news meant a kind 
of communication blurring the boundaries between fiction and the real world, and yet 
not intended to spread false information – such as political satire or parody (Holbert, 
2005). Now, after the wide spreading of fake news in the political domain in the last 
few years, the term has come to mean: 
a) (typically) false stories, 
b) describing events in the real world by mimicking the forms of traditional media 
reportages, 
c) fabricated and/or promoted on social media for various reasons, for example, for 
financial gain, but also for political propaganda, 
d) and meant for large audiences. (Rubin et al., 2015; Silverman, 2016; Mustafaraj-
Panagiotis, 2017; Alcott-Gentzkow, 2017; Rini, 2017; Jang-Kim, 2018). 
Many points in this very general definition are currently discussed in the ongoing 
conceptual analysis. They concern, for example, whether: a) the content of fake 
news is actually false or misleading or even, accidentally, true; b) the intention of the 
producer is to deceive people into believing the fake content or whether the deception 
is brought about as a byproduct; c) fake news is just meant for large audiences or 
must actually reach large audiences. Without further revolving this discussion, we can 
single out some specific differences of fake news from traditional political propaganda, 
manipulation and spin. They refer to the following features: 1) the way in which 
(typically) false or misleading information is fabricated, posted and disseminated 
through social media. 2) The dimension of the disinformation, due to the size of the 
affected audiences and to the speed of the dissemination compared with traditional 
forms. 3) The platforms’ design, which systematically exploits cognitive features of 
social media users. 4) The powerful effect on agenda setting in the political discourse 
of a society. All such features are linked to the favorite media of transmission of fake 
news, namely social media and web platforms. Fake news travels also on traditional 
media, in politicians’ speeches and announcements, but only social media make it 
viral, while traditional media often simply reproduces the fake news from social media. 
1.2. I intend now to understand whether the proliferation of fake news significantly 
affects citizens’ political beliefs and consequently their political behavior, in ways 
that were not accessible to traditional propaganda and spin. I shall argue that thanks 
to certain features of the web platform, exploiting human cognitive mechanisms, fake 
news travels fast and has a good chance to influence people’s beliefs. Recent research 
has proved that false information is more intensely spread by social network users, and 
that users’ reposting behavior is prompted by cognitive features, which web platforms 
exploit. The very same cognitive features priming dissemination are likely to induce 
belief in the content of fake news as well. 
Current research has successfully shown the platform’s algorithms allow producers 
to find the people likely to disseminate the false news, and that the dissemination 
is parasitic on cognitive features of users. Thus, fake news producers exploit the 
technological possibilities of the platforms to reach potentially sensitive users 
(Mustafaraj-Panagiotis, 2017), while clickbait headlines exploit the proneness to 
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attention grabbing cues of human minds (Chen, Conroy, Rubin, 2015). In general, 
cognitive traps and heuristics are more easily triggered in social media contexts (Levy, 
2017), indirectly inducing the spread of falsehoods in social media users. In fact, the 
results of recent research on Facebook (Silverman, 2016) and Twitter (Vosoughi et 
al., 2018) have proved that false information tends to propagate at a higher speed, 
more broadly and in a deeper way than true information. Such works actually concern 
the diffusion of news on social media, while not advancing any claims about beliefs. 
Retweeting or reposting is not equivalent to endorsing and believing the information 
one is transmitting. Yet, a precondition for a piece of news to be believed is to reach 
out to people, and, in that sense, the broader and faster spreading of fake news 
increases the probability of its being believed. The hypothetical correlation between 
news diffusion and corresponding beliefs must however be analyzed more closely.
Actually, the cue priming retweeting has to do with the novelty of the message and 
the surprising, and occasionally disgusting, nature of the transmitted news (Vosoughi 
et al., 2018), hence not with the truth credentials of the news. In this respect, it would 
seem that believing fake news and spreading it have no special correspondence. Here 
is however the juncture where cognitive traps of human reasoning are triggered, in 
such a way that spreading the news makes it easier to come to believe it. Two different 
cognitive mechanisms can be activated by spreading the news leading to believing 
its content. The first is predicted by perception theory, and that is the tendency to 
infer belief from behavior, or, to put it differently, to use behavior as a sign of the 
correspondent belief, justifying the behavior ex post (Bem, 1967; Bem et al., 1970). In 
this sense, retweeting may be taken by the agent as the sign of the correspondent belief, 
ex post justifying the action of spreading the message. This tendency is especially 
present if the agent is unclear or confused about what to believe, hence infers belief 
from behavior. The second mechanism consists in the effect on fluency processing of 
information, so that a more easily retrievable stimulus affects what people come to 
believe (Alter, 2007; Rapp et al., 2014). The fluency effect strikes automatically, even 
if, originally, one had doubts about that piece of information, and it may be activated 
by the salience and simplicity of the message, as well as by repetition and familiarity. 
It may seem that novelty, the cue priming retweeting, and familiarity, activating 
fluency, are going in opposite directions concerning their effect on belief, and that the 
one should limit the effect of the other. In fact, in the dissemination of fake news, the 
two, apparently opposite, cues are likely to work in the same direction. The novelty 
arouses attention and surprise, which make the message salient and the subjects prone 
to suggestibility, so as to induce reposting (Eslik, Fazio, Marsh, 2011). Then, reposting 
is a repetition of the piece of information, which is likely to be only the first of many, 
for the message can reach the user through other cascades and from traditional media 
commenting on it. Repetition increases familiarity, which favors fluency processing 
ending up in believing the message. Repetition, moreover, activates another cognitive 
mechanism, which kicks in with the perception that the information is shared and 
held by others, reinforcing the belief in it being true. The larger the number of people 
believing that P affects the tendency to acquire and share the belief that P. Now it is 
unclear whether the influence of a popular view on our doxastic system belongs to the 
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same kind of automated mechanisms above described or not, for the fact that a belief 
is shared among other people is often a reasonable corroboration of its truth (Schwarz 
et al., 2016). If however other grounds justifying the belief are lacking, accepting a 
belief as true because it is largely popular may be a display of conformity bias. Clearly, 
the multiplying effect of social media largely amplifies this tendency, contributing to 
making falsehoods being believed as true facts. In sum, web platforms take advantage 
of a series of cognitive mechanisms to induce dissemination and, indirectly, also 
beliefs in false or misleading information. Some of these cognitive mechanisms 
properly embody cognitive mistakes, as in the case of self-perception, which is a 
distorted form of self-attribution of beliefs ex-post based on actual behavior1. Others 
are instead heuristics, such as fluency, belonging to the automated pre-reflexive way 
of reasoning, which speed up our cognitive process through bypassing epistemic rules, 
and, under the appropriate circumstances, may well produce reliable judgments open 
to epistemic justification (Reber, unkelbach, 2014). Yet, heuristics can as well lead 
to wrong conclusions in unfavorable circumstances. Beside heuristics, also cognitive 
biases, that is systematic prejudices distorting the acquisition of knowledge, such 
as the conformity bias and more importantly the confirmation and disconfirmation 
biases, are triggered in the process contributing to the belief in false information. 
Thus, research in communication science seems to support the view that fake news 
represents a danger of disinformation of high proportions in our society, given the 
multiplying effect of the web and of social media. 
Many studies have focused on a number of factors that seem to corroborate the 
hypothesis of the influence of fake news on political behavior. Such factors comprise: 
a) the mass of false political information, spread hugely through the web; b) the number 
of people relying on social networks or on fake news sites instead of traditional media; 
c) the quantity of fake news disseminated in the campaigns; d) the persistence of false 
beliefs even after successful debunking; e) the backfire effect of debunking even among 
cultivated people. Research in the area of communication of new media is still novel 
and the experimental results are often ambiguous and indeterminate (Pennycook, Rand, 
2019a). Yet, in general, it seems to suggest the grim conclusion that we are all victims 
of fake news, no matter how cultivated and intelligent (Levy, 2017), and that no special 
weapon against believing disinformation is available, apart from censorious intervention 
on the very platforms, either by their managers or by governments. Such a solution from 
above, so to speak, is however seen by most as at least as problematic as fake news.
Before subscribing to this conclusion, however, I would like to stress that: a) none 
of the factors listed above prove that people’s beliefs have been twisted by fake news; 
b) the association of retweeting or reposting and believing the content of the piece of 
news is only hypothetical. Some scholars actually question this association and instead 
attribute the tendency to disseminate contents without actually believing them to a form 
of “bullshitting”2 or to an affective tendency “to participate in the game” (Croce and 
Piazza, 2021). Therefore, if fake news can certainly facilitate the diffusion of distorted 
beliefs, its effect on the epistemic condition of the public, for example twisting citizens’ 
voting behavior, is far from settled and probably not as threatening as assumed.
Focusing specifically on political fake news and its effect on political attitudes 
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and voting behavior, another relevant element should be considered with reference 
to the cause of political disinformation among citizens. As the studies on political 
polarization show, fake news with political content is mainly believed according to the 
partisan identification of platforms’ users. This fact has suggested that what prompted 
belief in political fake news is especially the effect of partisan identities. In this case, 
however, firstly, political fake news reinforces rather than twists political behavior; 
secondly, believing fake news according to partisanship points to motivated reasoning 
as the main culprit of political disinformation. This phenomenon, which I am going to 
explore in detail in a moment, tends to support the thesis that the distortion of political 
beliefs, though facilitated by fake news, has a largely independent explanation in 
motivated reasoning fueled by partisanship. 
2. Motivated Reasoning, Partisanship and Ideology
2.1. We have seen above that certain automated cognitive mechanisms are triggered 
by the web platform, making it easier to believe in fake news. Such cognitive 
mechanisms are “cold”, being independent of motivation and affect, and, besides, 
they strike everyone, independently of ideological and partisan affiliations. Whether 
the piece of information is favorable or not to Trump should not affect how fluency 
and familiarity strike in Trump’s supporters as well as in his opponents. The fact, 
however, that Trump’s supporters accepted as true the infamous “pizzagate” news 
spread during the last uS presidential campaign against Hillary Clinton, concerning 
the use of a pizza parlor’s basement in Washington for pedophile activities (Cush, 
2016), and persisted in their belief even after the allegation was proved absolutely 
groundless, while Democrats did not, needs explaining. Such information was new, 
surprising and attention grabbing: such features may contribute to making it salient, 
and, in turn, salience may trigger fluency processing. This kind of news arouses 
attention and emotional responses of both surprise and disgust, as reported by 
Vosoughi’s research, and sticks in one’s memory much more than mundane pieces 
of fact. Partisan misinformation through social media is especially apt to elicit such 
cognitive responses. As said, however, fluency should strike indiscriminately either 
conservatives or liberals, Republicans as well as Democrats. The fact that it does 
not leads me to consider the motivational component as crucial for accepting or 
rejecting political (dis)information. Trump’s supporters wanted to believe in Clinton’s 
involvement in pedophile activities, actively contributed to the news propagation, and 
resisted debunking, no matter how outrageously unlikely the news appeared. Hence, 
this instance supports the view that motivated reasoning was here at work.
Motivated reasoning is the tendency to look for reasons to justify an opinion or 
a belief that the agent is eager to uphold (Kunda, 1987; Kruglanski, 1996; Mercier-
Sperber, 2011; Kahan, 2013; Kahan et al., 2016; Sinatra et al., 2014; Weeks, 2015). 
When motivated, the reasoning is not driven by accuracy goals, but by the goal of 
confirming previous beliefs or opinions or disconfirming evidence contrary to one’s 
doxastic set. Different kinds of motivation can interfere and distort reasoning, but 
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in general all motivations have to do with the defense of the self and its identity 
– from the wish to be in the right to the rejection of information threatening one’s 
family, friends and associates. Apparently hardwired in the evolution of our mind, 
motivated reasoning is served by two crucial biases: confirmation and disconfirmation 
biases. When people meet with information in line with their previous beliefs, they 
are ready to accept it without much ado, while when faced with adverse information, 
they engage in sophisticated counterarguments to reject it. The argumentative theory 
of reasoning (Mercier-Sperber, 2011) provides an explanation of the asymmetry in 
accepting consonant and countering adverse evidence: if the reasoning function is to 
persuade others, then it is the adverse information that represents a challenge, and not 
the favorable. The complex rationalizations against counter-evidence provide reasons 
to rebut the thesis that disinformation would originate in poor thinking (Pennicock, 
Rand, 2019b), for the more sophisticated the reasoners, the better they are at producing 
counterarguments and at defending their viewpoints even against the evidence (Kahan 
et al., 2016). The analysis of motivated reasoning in cognitive psychology corresponds 
to the studies on motivated irrationality in the area of epistemology and philosophy of 
mind. Though developed largely independent from one another, the empirical findings 
of experimental psychology and neuroscience appear to corroborate the philosophical 
theses of motivated irrationality, which, on their parts, provide a wider and persuasive 
interpretive framework for it, and especially of the two most common instances, i.e., 
wishful-thinking and self-deception, as we shall see in a while3.
2.2. If motivated reasoning pushes agents to believe what is in line with their set 
of beliefs and values, then people’s worldviews are crucial for selecting which 
information to accept or to reject. And people’s worldviews are precisely ideological 
convictions. Sharing the same ideology traces the boundary of a social group and of 
a collective identity which, in the appropriate circumstances, triggers the in-group/
out-group attitudes and the disposition to act accordingly (Tajfel, Turner, 1979). 
People’s ideology often mirrors political parties’ positions: at this point, ideology 
joins forces with partisanship, insofar as it provides a political identity for members; 
the identification with the in-group may vary in intensity between individuals and 
according to social contexts, but, in any case, it affects the sense of self in proportion 
to the intensity of partisanship. I shall come back to the controversial connection 
between ideology, partisanship and political identity. At present, I would like to 
stress that there are two potentially motivational distortive mechanisms of belief 
formation working in the same direction. One is the motivated reasoning prompted 
by the motivation to have one’s ideology confirmed; in this case, ideology works 
as an epistemic selector to accept or reject news, according to its fitting/not fitting 
into one’s ideological landscape. The other is the motivated reasoning prompted by 
defending one’s group affiliation, filtering information on an affective basis, according 
to whether it is favorable or unfavorable to one’s group. The two types of motivation 
for processing political information may work jointly to enhance and protect both the 
ideological outlook and the group identity. Both the ideological stability and the sense 
of belonging provided by partisan affiliation contribute to confirming a positive sense 
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of self and “people go to great lengths to view the world in a way that maintains a sense 
of well-being. We are masterly spin-doctors, rationalizers, justifiers of threatening 
information” (Wilson, 2000, p. 49). 
At this point, I think a little digression to clear what I hold to be a confusion in the 
literature on partisan social identity versus ideology, and the consequences of such 
a confusion on democratic theory, is in order. The study of the in-group/out-group 
psychology through Teifel’s experiment, back in the seventies, has shown that people 
tend to categorize similarities and differences with others in groups, and that groups 
are useful cognitive tools to navigate the social world. Besides, and more importantly, 
interindividual similarities lead to swift group identification, and membership in 
the group brings with it a sense of belonging, bonding and emotional significance. 
Social identities are thus formed, becoming part of the individual’s self-concept and 
positively contributing to her sense of worth. The two relevant findings of Tejfel’s 
experiments are that the group-identification can take place with reference to the most 
casual and extrinsic characteristics, such as preferring Klee over Kandisky, and that, 
even in such cases, it engenders the in-group attitude of loyalty and trust, as well as 
the feelings of strangeness, competition and potential hostility with members of the 
out-group. The in-group/out-group attitudes easily translate into favoritism for one’s 
group members and discrimination against other groups. From this study a theory of 
social identity has developed (Huddy, 2001), which, once applied to politics, has been 
used to make sense of partisanship, not on the basis of a shared vision, values and 
interests but on the basis of the gut-feeling identification with a group (Iyengan, 2012; 
Mason, 2016; Huddy et al., 2015). Race, gender, ethnicity, regional origin, and the like, 
can give rise to political identities; in turn leaders and spokespeople of such groups 
influence the political choices and behavior of members. Thus, political partisanship 
seems to have no cognitive grounds in beliefs and opinions and to resemble more the 
affiliation to a soccer team than sharing a political ideology (Achen, Barry, 2016). In 
this case, the normative grounds of democracy seem to tremble, for citizens’ choices 
would be neither informed nor rational. Though the social identity theory can throw 
light on how people can join political groups based on certain similarities instead 
of shared ideas and values, I also believe that its application to politics should be 
properly reshuffled. On the one hand, no matter how much hardwired in human 
evolution the in-group/out-group distinction is, in our society social identities are 
multiple, and dynamic, sometimes overlapping and sometimes conflicting; moreover 
individuals happen to move from one to another, so that in-group attitudes cannot 
be taken as the ultimate determinant of political behavior. On the other, if groups 
are selected on the basis of interindividual similarities, firstly, sharing an ideology, 
possibly represented by a party, is one significant political similarity providing strong 
identity and bonding. Secondly, even though sorted by race or gender, religion or 
otherwise, groups, as a rule, bring along ideas, positions and political agendas, for 
example, for fighting racism and sexism, and against discrimination and for social 
justice. Even if the affiliation has been triggered by a common sense of belonging 
and, for example, of some shared experience of injustice, then the group develops 
positions on antidiscrimination and justice from their privileged perspective (Young, 
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2000; Mansbridge, 1999; Lapoutre, 2020). We can say that there are two paths 
to partisanship: the first going from ideology to identification with like-minded 
people, often represented by a party, which provides the political identity, and the 
second going from the identification with a group sharing same salient traits, such 
as ethnical origin, religion, sex orientation, to the political positions put forward by 
the group. In other words, political identities usually comprise both the affective and 
the cognitive dimension of group identification, whose relative strength may change 
over individuals and over time, occasionally giving rise to the phenomenon recorded 
in a few researches of following the group’s leader predicaments even against the 
traditional values and positions of the group (Achen, Barry, 2016). Yet, there are no 
two alternative explanations of partisanship, ideology versus identity, for the two 
are typically intertwined and both provide motivation for the swift acceptance of 
favorable information and for the resistance to adverse news. 
2.3. Coming back to the (usually) joint effect of ideology and partisan affiliation on 
information processing, I would like to point out that sorting out news according to 
one’s affiliations is not always outright unreasonable. Regina Rini (2017), for example, 
has extensively argued for the reasonable component of referring to partisan views. If 
someone shares a certain view of politics and society with a group, and is genuinely 
convinced it is true, she has reason to trust her group. As much as one rightly trusts the 
testimony of a trustworthy friend, similarly, one tends to trust information coming from 
one’s party or group, for their commonality makes them trustworthy. In that respect, 
believing information coming from the party or group that one trusts is in general 
subjectively reasonable, at least if the content of the news fits with what one knows 
about the world and is consistent with one’s other beliefs. In a complex information 
environment, where news is abundant and costly to evaluate properly, referring to 
one’s party position may be a reasonable strategy, a shorthand for getting informed. 
Yet, the reasonable component is only a part, and a minor part for all that, of the 
story. More commonly, partisan affiliation tends to trigger motivated reasoning when 
processing information. Especially in cases where partisan affiliation predominantly 
depends on identity traits, trusting partisan information has little reasonable component 
and may lead to believing favorable fake news even in cases where the content of the 
news is outrageous and striking and not easily compatible with general knowledge, 
and is believed just under the influence of the affective motivation. That is not to say 
that all people with a partisan affiliation are always victims of belief distortion. We 
shall see that motivated reasoning is triggered under specific circumstances and that 
the intensity of partisanship as well as the content of partisan ideologies affect the 
reliance of one’s party/group’s position vis-à-vis accuracy. 
To recap on motivated reasoning in a polarized environment: when agents meet 
with news confirming their partisan position, they tend to believe it without much 
check on the trustworthiness of the source and of the truthfulness of the content. In 
the opposite case of meeting with adverse information, the same motivation blocks out 
the negative news. This is how partisan fake news is likely to be believed by partisans 
and rejected by opposing groups, and such a motivational epistemic shortcut is quite 
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independent from the nature of fake news, though the volume of disinformation is 
much higher in the era of social media and web platforms. The motivation to keep 
one’s political identity stable triggers the confirmation bias, producing the favorable 
belief or, in contrast, the disconfirmation bias, blocking out the adverse information. 
This is precisely what, in the motivated irrationality literature, has been analyzed 
as wishful thinking where a wish, a motivation directly induces the corresponding 
belief, under the appropriate circumstances, or with denial, when the adverse belief is 
blocked out. It must be noted, that the motivated mistrust of adverse news may well 
induce partisans to discard false information; yet, even if the outcome is epistemically 
correct, the process by which the outcome is produced is still driven by extra-epistemic 
motivation.
Some researchers object to the motivational impact of ideological affiliation on 
beliefs and attribute such an effect to the “consistency push” (Schwarz et al., 2016). 
According to this alternative view, if one firmly holds a worldview, one is inclined 
to believe any news consistent and fitting into that view. The “consistency push” is 
neither irrational nor motivational: actually, among the criteria for evaluating whether 
a belief can be accepted as true, one is precisely its consistency with the other beliefs 
one holds, and another is the coherence of the content of the information. However, 
as we have seen, in the case of fake news with partisan content, partisan information 
is widely believed along partisan lines, even when the news is incoherent and does 
not fit with what is known about the world. Moreover, partisan fake news often 
has no ideological content to be fitted into one’s ideological outlook, but advances 
only negative and aggressive portrayals of the adversary. Preposterous news, such 
as pizzagate and Hilary Clinton, has nothing to do with ideology and policy, and, 
besides, is incoherent; thus, what makes people believe it, and especially what makes 
people resist correction, cannot be the consistency push, while the motivated reasoning 
interpretation fares much better.
Partisan motivation on reasoning appears especially remarkable in case of the 
resistance to accepting corrections. Even in the case of subsequent exposure to new 
and compelling evidence against the fake news, subjects tend to retain their false 
belief in line with their partisan affiliation, despite debunking. The fact that, once 
formed, beliefs seem immunized to new evidence and new arguments (Prior Belief 
Effect) is widely reported in many researches in experimental psychology and political 
psychology (Gilbert, Krull, Malone, 1990; Marsh, Fazio, 2006; Neylan, Reifler, 2010; 
Eslik, Fazio, Marsh, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Peter, Koch, 2016). More to the 
point, the research on debunking has found that often subjects exposed to evidence 
disconfirming the previous favorable fake news show a backfire effect, reinforcing, 
instead of revising, the false belief (Nyhan, Reifler, 2010; Cook, Lewandosky, 2011; 
Trevors et al., 2016)
Some researchers try to explain the Prior Belief Effect with reference to the working 
of memory and the concept of “belief echoes”. According to this interpretation, once 
we have formed a belief, traces of the latter persist in the memory like echoes, even 
after one is presented with contrary evidence, making it easier to retrieve the first false 
belief (Thorson, 2016). This interpretation may explain why, at a later time after the 
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correction, subjects retrieve the first belief, but it does not explain why people resist 
correction as soon as they are presented with new evidence. Other scholars interpret 
the persistence of prior beliefs despite the evidence as a lack of cognitive reflection 
when processing information (Pennycook, Rand, 2019b). According to Pennycook 
and Rand, the susceptibility to partisan fake news is explained by the reliance on the 
intuitive and fast system S1, based on heuristics and easily subject to errors (Kanheman, 
2011), hence on the failure to think correctly. It is certainly true that people who resist 
corrections of prior beliefs are not thinking correctly; whether this failure is attributable 
to laziness and to reliance on S1, or whether is induced by the interference of motivation 
is however beyond the scope of Pennycook and Rand’s research. All in all, the majority 
of studies on the Prior Belief Effect acknowledge the relevance of motivation in holding 
and keeping an unwarranted belief (Edwards, Smith, 1996; Kahan, 2013; Kahan, 2016; 
Ecker et al., 2014; Weeks, 2015; Trevors et al., 2016).
In fact, I think that the resistance to debunking may find a persuasive interpretive 
framework in the studies of motivated irrationality as an instance of self-deception. 
Self-deception is the case when a subject believes that P according to her wish but 
against available evidence. Thus, if a subject, who has formed the belief that P in 
line with her partisan view, is presented with evidence showing that P is false, and 
nevertheless persists in believing that P, she is precisely self-deceived. The irrationality 
displayed by subjects in the backfire effect neatly fits into the framework of self-
deception. A feature of self-deception, as a distinct type of motivated irrationality, is 
that the self-deceiver engages the negative evidence with articulate counterarguments, 
so that she can end up keeping the false belief in the teeth of the evidence with no 
qualms. The reasoning against the evidence is faulty, but is not random or incoherent: 
it displays a quasi-rationality (Michel, Newen, 2010). That the backfire effect requires 
a certain sophistication in reasoning in order to counter the new evidence has been 
supported by a few researchers (Kahan, 2013). Kahan specifically advances the 
“identity protective cognition thesis”, according to which the ideologically motivated 
reasoning requires good analytical thinking for defending the convictions of one’s 
group via rationalization. Contrary to those who attribute the Prior Belief Effect to lack 
of thinking, Kahan actually claims that ideologically motivated reasoning is a form of 
expressive rationality whereas, in a highly polarized social context, it is individually 
rational to attend to information that is in line with the positions predominant in one’s 
group (Kahan, 2013, p. 420). I gather that Kahan’s expressive rationality is in the 
service of the protection of the group’s position, and that it is different from epistemic 
rationality4.
Summarizing, political disinformation, passed on through old and new media, tends 
to be believed according to partisan affiliations. That is to say, in general, partisans 
tend to believe favorable information and disbelieve adverse news. Therefore, the 
worry about the effect of fake news on political disinformation and consequently on 
changing political behavior should not be exaggerated, for the effect of fake news is 
definitely to amplify the misinformation, but apparently not that of shifting people’s 
positions and opinions. Relying on one’s party to navigate the communication world is 
not in principle irrational, as neither is it irrational to believe the testimony of a trusted 
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source, such as one’s party or group, nor to believe content consistent with one’s 
system of beliefs. Partisanship however also provides the motivation to believe what is 
in line with one’s political identity despite the lack of warrant and to disbelieve what is 
adverse in the teeth of evidence. In other words, under the appropriate circumstances, 
partisanship can prompt motivated irrationality, activating confirmation and 
disconfirmation biases, and making people immune to retraction. Lots of caveats and 
empirical details should be added to understand when and how precisely partisanship 
works in prompting motivated irrationality. In general, though, there is sufficient 
evidence from experimental psychology and communication theory to conclude that 
it is relevant in the production of political disinformation, via motivated reasoning. If 
this is true, the role of fake news and social media in polluting political communication 
is to be reassessed. Obviously, the production of disinformation through social media 
has widely increased and its dissemination is much faster and wider than traditional 
media and sources of political communication. In that sense, social media magnify 
the quantity of disinformation. Yet, the effect of the augmented disinformation on 
voting behavior is limited, given that partisan fake news tends to reinforce preexistent 
positions among citizens. 
If the impact of fake news on electoral turnout must thus be scaled down, 
nevertheless other dangers must be stressed. In particular, the way in which messages 
are formatted, passed on and commented by many people increases the polarization 
and the hostility and hate shown in the cascades, with the effect of transforming the 
public sphere into a battlefield, instead of a civil forum for discussion and reflection. At 
the extreme, there is the risk of mobilizing partisans towards dangerous, destabilizing 
actions, such as the recent assault on Capitol Hill, induced by the fake news that the 
Presidential election had been stolen. 
3. Variations in Susceptibility to Partisan Fake News
3.1. If partisan affiliation provides people with the motivation to believe favorable 
news, disbelieve adverse news and resist revision of prior beliefs, this fact does not 
imply that all people holding a partisan view or identifying with a group inevitably fall 
prey of wishful thinking, denial or self-deception when they meet with partisan fake 
news. On the one hand, the intensity of partisanship varies and with it the motivation 
to believe according to one’s party; on the other, the political context may be more or 
less polarized at different moments and on different issues. Moreover, if the resistance 
to debunking can be interpreted as a form of self-deception, the latter is a selective 
process distorting belief, which does not take place all the times reality disconfirms our 
desires. Similarly, sharing a political identity is not sufficient to believe any favorable 
false news or disbelieve any adverse false news. In order to face the issue of selectivity, 
students of self-deception have pointed out a number of circumstances which make the 
distortive process more likely to start (Galeotti, 2018). I shall cite the following: 
1. the belief that P fulfills a crucial motivational-element for S well-being and 
prospects;
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2. some negative evidence ~E potentially threatening the truth of P becomes known 
to S; 
3. the knowledge of ~E makes P the object of S’s emotionally loaded wish that P;
4. S is not, or perceives not to be, in a position to undo the threat; hence, the costs of 
inaccuracy are negligible.
Thus, emotions are a crucial factor, switching on a wish that is important for the 
subject’s identity, and, in cases where the costs of inaccuracy are negligible or can 
be ignored, the thinking leading to the self-deceptive belief is likely to start. Simi-
larly, various circumstances have been pointed out as incentives or disincentives 
to partisan motivated reasoning. First of all, the intensity of the partisan affiliation, 
corresponding to the circumstance (1) above listed. Secondly, a highly divisive and 
antagonistic context can be perceived as a threat to the partisan identity, fulfilling 
the circumstance (2). Thirdly, the accompanying emotions are important in favo-
ring or disfavoring the partisan motivated reasoning. Some research on partisanship, 
emotions and misperceptions has found a correlation between anger and partisan 
motivated evaluation of misinformation, ending up with beliefs consistent with one’s 
party (Weeks, 2015). On the contrary, anxiety seems to lead people with a partisan 
affiliation to an evaluation more dependent on the information environment and less 
on partisanship. The conclusion of this research is that partisanship alone does not 
drive motivated reasoning, but it does so in connection with attitudes tied to anger 
and resentment. Relative to anxiety, a low level of anxiety seems to incentivize ac-
curacy in information gathering and processing aimed at settling the uncertainty felt 
by the subject. By contrast, a high level of anxiety “could make individuals more 
susceptible to uncorrelated false claims that reflect negatively on their own party” 
(Weeks, 2015, p. 704)5. Fourthly, citizens are not generally in a position to undo the 
unwelcome information by being accurate, and, in this sense, they have no inaccuracy 
costs, corresponding to circumstance (4) of the above list. Partisan and ideological 
self-deception work no differently from other kinds of self-deception, and require the 
same set of favorable circumstances. 
3.2. Some empirical studies researching the variations concerning the reception of 
partisan fake news have found that the values deeply held by people, whether or not 
present in their ideological outlook, may make a difference. Thus, for example, it seems 
that people who have been educated in the values of fairness and non-discrimination 
appear to be more resistant to favoring in-group members and keener to a fairer 
consideration of the subject matter (Resnick, 2018). Similarly, people who have been 
trained in being more accurate in truth evaluation, such as judges, actually display a 
more robust exercise in accuracy than average (Mitchell, 2019). Such findings are 
extremely interesting not only because they explain the variations among partisans in 
falling for fake news, but also because they show that, no matter how hardwired we 
are in motivated reasoning and in-group attitudes, appropriate normative principles and 
training can counteract cognitive distortions and reduce the effect of affective affiliation. 
Here we have found a hint for measures aimed at mitigating the effect of partisan 
fake news, namely moral training. I would like to stress that this hint must not be 
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equated to the straightforward appeal to individual responsibility for one’s doxastic set 
and to epistemic virtues. We must take our cognitive and moral failings, hardwired in 
automated cognitive and affective mechanisms, very seriously; hence, moral training 
must be prior to the appeal to responsibility and virtues6. Through moral training 
and discipline, good habits can induce the disposition to fairness and to accuracy, by 
fortifying the character against the force of hardwired mechanisms. In turn, moral 
training calls into question the role of political institutions in education and in the 
distribution of equal opportunity in that respect. Given that here I am analyzing the 
variations in susceptibility to partisan fake news, I will not pursue these normative 
considerations further; I only want to point out the empirical findings that can open a 
line of interesting normative interventions.
3.3. Finally, we have to consider that, even in a highly polarized and divisive 
political environment, there are citizens with no or mild partisan affiliations. What 
is the effect of fake news on them? It would seem that, absent partisan affiliations, 
they are relatively free from motivated reasoning, but, at the same time, they may 
be more easily prey to fake news thanks to the cold cognitive mechanisms that we 
have discussed in the first section. Thus, the misleading content of fake new, if it has 
little effect on partisans whose positions seem to be immune to contrary information, 
may have an impact on non-partisans. In turn, such an impact may prove serious for 
democratic turnouts, given that elections are won or lost with relatively little margin 
of votes at the center of the political spectrum. 
In support of this worry, recent research has found that, on divisive campaign issues, 
disguised paid ads were posted on Facebook, precisely targeting electoral districts and 
states with an uncertain turnout (Kim et al., 2018). What was particularly tricky did not 
so much concern the content of the posts, but their disguised nature: they appeared as 
normal posts by Facebook users, instead of propaganda ads. The analysis tracked them 
down to groups not even filed in the Federal Election Commission, in other words 
suspicious groups or even foreign entities. The deception in this case concerned first 
and foremost the origin of the news, given that had the source been honestly declared 
to users, the probability of its content being believed by the recipients would have been 
largely reduced. After all, people are pretty good at distinguishing advertising from 
news, and even if advertisement may influence consumers’ choices, very few believe 
that a cream can miraculously cancel wrinkles or grow hair on a bald head. In this 
respect, the risk of the spread of political disinformation through fake news appears 
more linked to the source than to the content of the news. 
Partly, the issue of source opacity has been taken up by the very platforms, such as 
Facebook, by means of the use of flags alerting about messages whose source seems 
suspicious. It is not clear whether this action suffices to address the issue of social media 
transparency, nor, to my knowledge, are there works that have analyzed whether the 
warning has the effect of making people more alert to the information they receive. The 
flags system, ex hypothesi, might work in the direction of creating a disfluency in the 
social media user. As said in the first section, a crucial automated mechanism inducing 
reposting at first, but then, very likely also believing fake news is fluency processing of 
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information: the more familiar and easily retrievable a piece of information, the more 
likely that fluency leads the subject to believe in it. Some researchers have hypothesized 
that, by blocking fluency somehow, subjects may make use of a more reflective type 
of reasoning (Alter et al., 2007). In fact, Alter et al. have found that when subjects 
experience metacognitive difficulty in activating fluency processing, they instead 
activate analytic forms of thinking that assess and in some cases correct the output of 
more intuitive forms of processing information. The flag system, and in general any 
disclosure about the source, should work as a disfluency device, leading to a more 
critical validation of the received information. This suggestion needs to be properly 
tested by experimental research, yet it suggests a type of measure against fake news 
which looks important and bypasses the quest for content censorship. 
Coming back to the risk of fake news influencing the voting behavior of non-
partisan citizens, some evidence seems to point to a lesser danger than it may seem. 
For example, during the 2018 midterm election in America, the amount of fake news 
in political information diminished compared to the 2016 Presidential election, and 
reached fewer people (Guess, 2018a; Resnick, 2018). Moreover, there has been 
reported a growing awareness among the public of the dangers and of the limits of 
social media (Graves-Cherubini, 2016; Mitchell, 2019). The awareness of the danger 
of fake news is the first step to exercising vigilance over the information passed on 
via the social media and reechoed in the old media (Chamber, 2020). In sum, the risk 
that fake news influences non-partisan beliefs and attitudes is real, but must be put in 
perspective, on the one hand, while, on the other, potential remedies to the automated 
cognitive distortions can be found.
Conclusions
Summarizing, concerning the effect of fake news on citizens’ political attitudes 
and voting orientation, we have seen that fake news is mostly believed according 
to partisan lines, due to motivated reasoning triggered by partisan identities. Thus, 
with reference to citizens with a definite partisan identity, fake news may increase 
their disinformation, but not change their attitudes and voting behavior, which on 
the contrary are reinforced. Considering instead non-partisans or weak partisans, the 
disinformation passed on by fake news may well affect their political attitude and 
position by triggering automated cognitive mechanisms. However, we have seen that 
the growing awareness of the fake news threat by the public is a first step in the direction 
of keener vigilance on news. In turn, vigilance may be activated by disfluency, and the 
flags system, adopted by some platforms, may work in this direction, alerting users 
to suspicious sources. Finally, there is evidence that, despite all the psychological 
constraints in the way of epistemic correctness, epistemic accuracy can be enhanced 
by proper training and practice; this is a plan for the future and yet encouraging for 
viewing citizens not simply as helpless victims of disinformation.
There are, however, other reasons for alarm about the democratic public starting 
with the increase of polarization concerning any public issues which rightly or wrongly 
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come to be at the center of public debate, be it policies, vaccines, climate change and 
science communication. A highly polarized public sphere is an impediment to an 
accurate consideration of the pros and cons of the issue at hand and even the people 
who are not siding either way find it difficult to understand the merit of the question, 
and to single out dependable information and trustworthy sources. A good example 
of such damage is provided by the reception of the measures taken in the present 
pandemic crisis. All public policies to contain contagion and to fight the virus have 
been subjected to contestation based on fake news’s disinformation and consequent 
emotional positions which have polarized society between no mask, no vax, no social 
distancing vs. science, in a moment when social cooperation is crucial. 
In general, fake news contributes to make the communication environment 
muddy, with reference to the quality and the truth-value of the information passed 
on, and cacophonic, with reference to the instrumental and circular accusations of 
any critical opinion targeting the government or single politicians to be fake-news. 
Moreover, public information is overcrowded and confused, given that truth, falsity 
and “bullshitting” are all mixed and difficult to disentangle. In turn, this phenomenon 
induces citizens to lose trust in political communication, and, in general, in politics 
and politicians. This mistrust hits traditional media as well and also, more generally, 
experts and science as sources of reliable information and data. These phenomena are 
worrying and complex: they require both an interpretive and a normative analysis in 
depth, which is however outside the more limited scope of the present work. In the 
present communication confusion, my purpose has been to circumscribe the issue to 
the impact of fake news on political attitudes and voting behavior, aiming at dispelling 
the idea that fake news can wantonly twist electoral turnout. Interestingly the analysis 
has shown paths for future research. On the side of normative analysis, it has thrown 
light on how empirical findings can provide suggestions for normative proposals taking 
into account human cognitive constraints, while, on the side of a critical perspective 
on politics, it has pointed to the effective dangers of fake news in the public sphere to 
be aptly considered in a properly dedicated inquiry. 
Notes
1 Self-perception has been interpreted as a form of reduction of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957).
2 The tendency to spread fake news as a form of bullshitting has been brought to my attention by a 
paper presented by Ciro De Florio and Aldo Frigerio on “What is Fake News?” (Vercelli, 23 October 
2020).
3 The literature on self-deception, for example, provides a detailed analysis of the wishes and motives 
triggering the distorted reasoning, distinguishing stubborn beliefs from self-deceptive beliefs (Galeotti, 
2018a)
4 Without getting here into the discussion of Kahan’s thesis, I cannot but remark that, in the literature 
on self-deception as well, there are scholars holding that while self-deception is epistemically irrational, 
it is nevertheless practically rational insofar as it fulfills a goal of the subject who wishes to believe that 
p. I will not discuss here the dual rationality thesis; I only want to point out the similarities of Kahan’s 
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research with the studies on self-deception. My point here is rather that, although the experimental 
research on the backfire effect largely ignores the literature on self-deception, actually its empirical 
findings correspond to the interpretive framework of self-deception, which, on its part, is able to throw 
new and deeper light on the Prior Belief Effect.
5 Such a distinction between low-level anxiety and high-level anxiety in inducing, respectively, 
accuracy or misperceptions corresponds to a study by Robert Jervis on political misperception (Jervis, 
1975). More specifically, Jervis noted that a high level of anxiety and circumstances in which subjects are 
powerless induce defensive avoidance that is a typical “straight” case of self-deception where the subject 
falsely believes according to her wish. In Weeks’s research, notably, a high level of anxiety induces 
instead a “twisted” type of self-deception, where the subject falsely comes to believe what she does not 
want to be the case (Mele, 2001; Galeotti, 2018a)
6 Here I take the Aristotelian position that virtues must be thought and become habits, for without the 
proper education the agent falls prey to the weakness of the will. This view is convincingly articulated in 
the framework of the theory by George Ainslie (2000) who, however, does not develop the institutional 
implication concerning education.
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